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Abstract
Title: Participation and Worker Satisfaction
Author: Anna Margaret Hardman
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of Master in City Planning at the Massachussetts institute of Technology
This thesis explores the effectiveness of worker participation
in reducing job alienation, and the implications of participation
by workers for the behavior of the firm. The study uses data from
experiments with industrial and office workers in which participation
was a variable, and data from other studies of participation in work
environments. The evidence shows that participation increases job
satisfaction, and that direct participation and participation at
shopfloor level are both more effective in raising morale than indirect
participation and participation at the level of the firm.
Economic models of the firm were used to compare the behavior of
worker controlled firms with that of entrepreneurial capitalist firms.
Only models of firms completely controlled by workers have so far been
developed, but this chapter outlines some tentative hypotheses about
firms with intermediate amounts of participation are developed. The
assumptions made in existing theoretical models of the worker controlled
firm are questioned, and alternative assumptions developed which
correspond better to what we know of the effects of oarticipation within
the firm. Implications of the new assump t i ons for the firm's policies
for quality of the work environment, location policy, and pollution
policy are outlined.
On the basis of this study, some tentative suggestions are made as
to how worker participation can be a useful strategy for planners of
economic development in poverty areas and new communities.
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6ponent of the worker's total utility. The kind of
difference these characteristics of a job can make is
illustrated by the comparison of such autobiographical
comments as , on the one hand:
"I do... find enormous enjoyment in research and in the
writing of h istory. I am happy in it, and that is the
main thing".
And on the other hand:
"The time passes, but that's all. We spend a third of
our lives in the factory, but there's no overall purpose
or meaning to it other than the money. Back from the
holiday, we start counting up the weeks to the next: no
other dates qualify for significance except the date
when we are free. There's no sense of achievement about
the work, no feeling that we are creating or building
something. Producing the umpteenth chemical toilet
bucket will give us no more satisfaction than producing
the first". 3
These extreme examples show vividly how much the kind
and condi tions of work can affect the quali ty of a
person's life.
This paper argues that many of the non-wage
attributes of work or of jobs are not adequately dealt
with by the market so that additional costs of produc-
tion are borne by the workers. I t is concerned wi th
the feasibility, effectiveness and implications of a
method of solving this problem. The strategy studied
is participation by workers in enterprise decision-
making: a number of recent studies have suggested that:
"satisfaction in work is significantly enhanced by
increasing workers' decision-making powers on the job.
Under a great variety of work situations and among
7workers of vastly different levels of skill, work
satisfaction has been shown to increase even though
the technical processes of production and the workers'
tasks themselves remained unchanged".,
And another paper on the participation literature
concludes:
"Men will take greater pleasure and pride in their work
when they can participate in the shaping of the
decisions that affect their work". 5
The Problem of Social Products
The social products of production processes,
(costs and sometimes benefits not borne by the producing
firm), include, as well as some effects of work on
workers, the effects of production processes on the
community, such as pollution and some locational effects.
Both of these more familiar examples have been recognised
as legitimate topics for public conce rn. An enterprise
which pollutes air or water around it affects by so
doing the environment of residents in the community and
elsewhere who breathe the polluted air or drink polluted
water. In the absence of some form of effective regu-
lation, the costs of that pollution are borne not by the
firm which creates it but by the individuals affected,
or the community which must use, for example, water
purification processes to restore the status quo. Hence
we find it appropriate for government to intervene, with
regulation by law, or with taxes, to make the enterprise
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9necessities such as food and housing decreases. People
then can afford to concern themselves with other items
of consumption. Material consumer goods and services
are one such item. Another is the social goods which
affect the quality of life, such as environmental
quality, the availability of public leisure goods such
as parks and open spaces, and perhaps, as is argued
here, the quality of work conditions.
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Urban planning and the problem of work conditions
Planners' concern with work, jobs, and the labor
market, has traditionally focussed on the need to
provide employment for the community in which the planner
is planning. They often plan for the provision of jobs
where a labor force exists and needs jobs, as in plan-
ning for undeveloped rural areas or areas where
traditional industries are declining, and more recently,
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for ghetto areas where unemployment rates are high.
Or they plan for jobs as a way to attract population,
in planning new communities or for the growth of sub-
urban towns. Both strategies assume that policy must
be made within the structure of the existing economic
system. This limited viewpoint must necessarily
exclude the comparison of alternatives which may have
a much greater social value. A program which has been
used for the economic development of ghetto areas, and
which begins to explore alternative economic institu-
tions, is the Community Development Corporation (CDC)
idea, through which the economy developed for the
community retains as much as possible of the wages and
profits within the community and the firms can-be run
at least partly in the interests of local consumers and
workers instead of entirely in the interests of owners
who may be located elsewhere.
The traditional view of the nature of work and
jobs as they are relevant to planners is paradoxical,
given that planners are concerned with the quality of
the non-work time of the people they plan for, that is,
they develop recreational facilities and evaluate
development plans in terms of the social, not private
value of an 'attractive' physical environment. This
paper is concerned with the extension of that concern
for non-material or non-market value to institutions in
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the labor market with whose material value planners
al ready are concerned.
Structure of the Paper
The following chapter defines more rigorously the
problem of work conditions and the satisfying or
alienating character of the job. It pursues the ques-
tions of the nature and causes of work satisfaction and
analyses the labor market imperfections which make
quality of work an effect of production processes whose
cost is largely borne by the worker. Worker participa-
tion as a solution for further investigation is
discussed and compared with some alternative strategies.
In chapter 2 that solution, worker participation,
is described in more detail: alternative models of
worker participation in the structure of the firm and
its decisions are described. Using studies and examples
of cases in which worker participation is a factor, the
role of other factors (the level and amount of partici-
pation, for example) in modifying the impact on work
satisfaction is pursued. The problem is to determine
in what circumstances participation affects worker
satisfaction, and how much. The effects on work satis-
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Chapter 3 examines the meaning of worker
participation as it affects the behavior of the firm.
It pursues the issue of other effects of worker parti-
cipation, when it changes the behavior of the firm.
The effect of such a change on other parameters of the
firm's behavior is studied particularly with respect
to external effects.
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This paper does not pretend to present new first
hand research on the problem of participation and work
satisfaction. It is, rather, an attempt to use some
of the many studies which have been made of this topic
(by sociologists, economists, social psychologists,
manpower experts, and management experts) in a novel
way: to analyse the issues and extract the possible
implications for planners. Some reasons why their
interest in this issue can and should be expected to
increase are proposed above.
The information which is presented here cn the
effectiveness and conditions of workers' participation
may, also, be of interest to those who are interested
in the development of models of citizen participation
in planning. This field has been less studied than that
of worker participation, and some of the facts presented
here may be relevant: some of the same questions are
raised such as the effect of different levels of
participation, from observation to full control of
decisions, on the awareness or alienation of partici-
pants.
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Chapter I
THE QUALITY OF WORK, JOB SATISFACTION,
AND ALIENATION
Effects of work on the worker
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The quality of the work environment and the
Labor Market
in his account of the working of the labor
market, Adam Smith wrote:
"the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the
different employments of labor and stock must, in the
same neighborhood, be either perfectly equal or
continually tending to equality... this at least would
be the case in a society where things were left to
follow their natural course, where there was perfect
liberty, and where every man was perfectly free both
to choose what occupation he thought propIr, and to
change it as often as he thought proper".
In Smith's
run, while
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in wages be
that wages
"the whole
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system, inequalities occur in the short
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so occur when things are not l
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dirtiness", the "honorableness or dishonorableness" of
the employment, the "easiness and cheapness or the
difficulty and expense of its learning", its "constancy
or inconstancy", "the small or great trust which is
reposed in the worker", and "the probability or impro-
bability of success in the employment". Occupations
equal in other respects would tend to be equal in price,
but occupations unequal in other respects would be
unequal in price.
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A further factor which would in a perfect market
situation be included in the bundle of job attributes
to be equalised would be the quality of the job. That
is, if we abandon the assumption that labor or work
activities are necessarily non-fulfilling drudgery
undertaken to secure an income, and that creative acti-
vities leading to individual development must
necessarily be non-work or leisure activities, then
the perfect competition model of the labor market should
take into account the character of a job as drudgery,
or as creative or satisfying. It is this attribute
which we mean here by the quality of the job.
If the labor market worked as in the classical
theory, then entrepreneurs will improve work conditions
instead of raising wages as long as that is the cheaper
way of improving the relative attractiveness of the
job. Moreover, this process would take into account
any increases in productivity resulting from
Improvements in the quality of work.
In the real world, however, the labor market is
far from perfect. Workers are not free to move between
jobs and, by so doing, to express preferences for more
satisfying jobs at less pay, because in the job market
there are significant constraints to mobility in the
18
form of costs of entry, barriers to entry, and costs
of moving. Alienation is not, for this reason, a cost
to many workers which can be recouped through a. higher
supply price of labor. These workers are not able to
extract higher wages as "'compensation" because of
lack of meaningful satisfying alternatives available
to them. Insofar as a variety of work conditions
exists, the stratification of labor markets ,through
mobility constraintsinsures that persons in alienating
work environments have only similar environments as
alternatives. (For example, a factory worker does not
typically have the option of becoming a doctor). This
stratification of labor markets means that individuals
do not have equal access to jobs. Access to jobs is a
function of access to education and training, since
educational standards now set minimum admission criteria
for many jobs.
In a perfect market economy, human capital would
serve as collateral so that the individual can borrow
to increase his human capital investment, thereby
removing any budget constraint. In the real world,
human capital is inadequate collateral. Thus an indi-
vidual with few resources is unable to overcome his
budget constraint and acquire the necessary resources
for education.2 This is one of the factors which result
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ting them to offer their workers a lower quality of
work environment than they would in a perfect market.
Even where improved work conditions might increase
workers' productivity, the industry competitive
constraint on each firm may make any one firm unwilling
to take that risk unless all do so. This factor
explains why legislation is necessary to ensure that
socially preferred safety standards are provided in
industry.
In the introduction, a further factor was
mentioned: the institutions which govern much of the
bargaining between workers and employers are such that
negotiation is much more likely to take place cver
Issues such as wages or benefi ts whi ch can be valued
in money terms and which are the same for many plants
or locals. The large scale at which negotiations take
place between unions and employers , and the tendency
of smaller unions and employers to set thei r terms on
the basis set by these large institutions, effectively
ensures that issues of work condi tions whi ch are by
nature small scale, specific, local issues, will receive
less attention than those which are similar for all
plants and which are easily priced and compared by the
employers. The institutions surrounding the labor
market thus cause most of the non-wage and non-monetiz-
able attributes of the job to be imperfectly adjusted
between emp
attributes,
faction and
worker.3
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one
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r and employee preferences. Of these
central to this study is work satis-
effect of the work itself on the
The working of the labor market can, however,
provide supporting evidence for the contention that the
job satisfaction inherent in work is taken into account
by people choosing jobs. Daniel Patrick Moynihan a few
months ago was reported in the New York Times to have
exploded when asked if the work incentive
provisions in the (welfare reform) bill would force
people into jobs that were not "meaningful":
"Middle class aesthetes are going around saying
what is meaningful, what is meaningful employment?"
he declared, "Most people work for a living to earn
money for themselves and their families. They don't
ask whether what they are doi.n is meaningful. When
a farmer gets up at 6.30 to milk the cows, does he
stop and ask himself whether what he does is meaning-
ful?"
Moyni
attacking:
butes that
involvement
example: fa
the farmer
meaningful
is not to t
han's example supports the position he is
farming has non-wage (non-material) attri-
tend to offer the farmer a more meaningful
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rm work is varied; its pace is not constant;
makes decisions for himself; it can be as
to him as much blue collar industrial work
he laborer.
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Work Satisfaction and Alienation
While what we call "work" includes much that is
drudgery, or non-fulfilling activity which is undertaken
in order to secure an income, it may also be fulfilling,
creative and lead to individual development. These cactors do
not in reality distinguish non-work ("leisure")
activities from work. The historian quoted in the
introduction is one who enjoys his "work". Another is
"the Schoolteacher" who writes:
so for me teaching is important and valuable work
which I enjoy doing most of the time. It is a job
concerned with growing and developing individuals who
are never predictable and so provides a variety of
experience which is always stimulating. Teaching is a
two-way process with a feedback from the pupils which
constantly modifies a teacher's own approach; if the
danger of appearing an infallible oracle is avoided,
and a certain respect for the children one deals with
is cultivated, the job can be rewarding and sometimes
creative.5
The teacher attributes the interest of his job to its
changing content and the way it "constantly modifies a
teacher's own approach": it leads to individual
development.
Another writer attributes his liking for his job
to the fact that it is "interesting":
My trade was a good trade and I left plenty of
fellows on the melting shop who think the same as I do.
The same fellows are hoping that the vast change in
steel production will not be cataclysmic for them, that
the trade will still be interesting because it still
will need their skill... As for me, the open hearth
furnaces served me well and I served them well and I'm
not sorry we met. They gave me a chance of a worth-
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while working life in a tremendously interesting
industry. That doesn't always happen to working men. 6
Work can be inherently satisfying as well as a
source of income. This is not the result of work alone:
some jobs are more satisfying to human needs , of them-
selves, than others. 'Job satisfaction' refers both to
the attitudes to the job which a worker reports, and to
effects of the job on the worker which may be, but need
not be, expressed by the worker. This aspect of the
concept is close to the concept of alienation. Blumberg
writes that:
there are objective alienating qualities about
much labor and these are seen and felt as such by the
worker, although he perhaps does not articulate them
explicitly... an underlying strain of work alienation,
here greater, there lesser, seems to be endemic to the
world of work. 7
There are good reasons to hesitate before using
'alienation' to describe the issues which concern us
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The job content is the character of the job itself.
A job can be monotonous or varied, depending on the
extent of specialization in the production process; on
the level and responsibility of the job; the job may be
such as to include a high or low degree of control over
work methods and work pace; finally, it may use or
neglect the skills and abilities of the unemployed self
in the worker. Alvin Gouldner describes the effect of
non-fulfilling jobs as 'the unemployed self'. He
24
25
explains its effect:
The useless qualities of persons are, at first,
either unrewarded or actively punished should they
intrude upon the employment of a useful skill. In other
words the system rewards and fosters those skills deemed
useful and suppresses the expression of talents and
faculties deemed useless, and thereby structures and
imprints itself upon the individual personality and self.
Correspondingly, the
system requires; he learns
are unwanted and unworthy;
and personality in conform
standards of utility, and
of participating in such a
of any personality must be
the course of playing a ro
individual learns what the
which parts of hi-mself e-re
he comes to organize his self
ity with the operating
thereby minimizes his costs
system. In short, vast parts
suppressed or repressed in
le in industrial society. 9
The Work Group and the worker's relations with
his colleagues can be a source of satisfaction at work,
that is, the interaction involved at the workplace, and
the acceptance it offers.
The meaning of 'alienation' is far from clear,
and we are not concerned here with all the meanings it
has been given. As Blauner puts i t:
the term, now very
Modern man is said to be
other human beings, from
from his intellectual and
religion, belief
has become the i
of the impact of
worker.10
f ash i o
al iena
politi
art i s
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the alienation thesis
horthand interpretation
revolution on the manual
We are concerned not only with manual, industrial workers,
but with all workers or employees. But the phenomenon
we are concerned with as job satisfaction or as the
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social productivity of work itself, refers to the
alienating or non-alienating character of work, as well
as to the narrower conception of job satisfaction use.d
in industrial psychology:
the terms job satisfaction and job attitudes are
typically used interchangeably. Both refer to affective
orientations on the part of individuals toward work
roles which they are presently occupying. Positive
attitudes toward the job are conceptually equivalent to-
job satisfaction and negative attitudes toward the job
are equivalent to job dissatisfaction. 1 1
Our concept of job satisfaction differs from this because
it includes the objective effects of the job on the
worker, as well as the subjective attitudes of the
worker to the job, which are sometimes, but not always,
the only available measure of the former. The aliena-
tion concept also refers to the objective effects of
the job on the worker. Blauner defines it as follows:
alienation exists when workers are unable to
control their immediate work processes, to develop a
sense of purpose and function which connects their jobs
to the overall organization of production, to belong to
integrated industrial communities, and when they fail
to become involved in the 1 ctivi ty of work as a mode of
personal self-expression.
The four points he mentions are basic elements of job
satisfaction which concern us here.
We can compare this with Marx's description of
how i t comes about:
What then constitutes the alienation of labor?
First, the fact that labor is external to the worker,
i.e. It does not belong to his essential being; that
in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but
denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does
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not develop freely his physical and mental energy but
mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worke-r
therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in
his work feels outside himself... His labor is there-
fore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced .labor.
It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is
merely a means to satisfy needs external to it...
Lastly, the external character of labor for the worker
appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone
else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he
belongs, not to himself, but to another. 1 3
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Blauner talks about corresponds to Marx's "the relation
of the worker to the product of labor as an alien
object exercising power over him". This arises because
s
be
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the worker may have a sense of the valuelessness of
the product produced, or he may be isolated from other
workers. Meaninglessness can result from the nature
of a job in which the worker does one small task, with
no visible product, if he doesn't understand the pro-
duction process; if the product of his work is
standardised; or if the task is monotonous or
unchanging.
Social isolation, or the inability to belong to
an intergrated industrial community results from the
impersonality of bureaucracires and production
processes whose form is purely technologically deter-
mined. Work which is organized only around efficiency
criteria, and in which the commitment to work is
purely derived from extrinsic (e.g.) wage incentives
is most likely to produce this from of alienation (c.f.
Marx's mention of alienation in work which "is there-
fore not the satisfaction of a need... merely a means
to satisfy needs external to it".)
Self estrangement, or the inability to "become
involved in the activity of work as a mode of personal
self expression", 4e) results from jobs in which "labor
does not belong to... (the worker's) essential
being;... in his work, therefore, he does not affirm
himself but denies himself, does not feel content but
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unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental
energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind".
Self estrangement will exist where work does not sati-sfy
any personal needs, or is separated from the rest of
the worker's life.
The basis of Marx's analysis is that in industrial
society the separation of the worker from ownership
and control of the means of production produces alien-
ation. Alienation results from the growth of
capitalism and the fact that in capitalist society a
worker's product is controlled by, and goes to the
profit of the capitalist who owns the means of produc-
tion. A second stream of thought on alienation has
developed which attributes it to technical rather than
economic causes. Alienation of industrial workers is
attributed to the technology which the industrial
revolution introduced. Machines set the pace of work
and division of labor while increasing efficiency.
reduces the scope and content of each job. The two
explanations are not mutually exclusive: the develop-
ment of a new technology was basic to the development
of large scale firms and the growing distance between
the worker and his product which resulted. The two
explanations have a similar view of how the change in
Job content affected workers: Blauner summarised them
as:
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fragmentations in man's experience... (which
have) resulted from basic changes in social
organization brought about by the industrial revo-
lution.
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technology, ownership and decision-making. While
decision-making is usually vested in the owners of an
enterprise, that connection is not necessary. In
Yugoslavia, for example, it is the state which owns
the means 'of production, and the workers or their
elected representatives who have much of the power of
decision-making. Thus there are three possible
approaches to solving the problem of alienation:
changing technology, if alienation is the necessary
consequence of industrialization, in which case either
a new, non-alienating technology must be developed if
that is possible, or else the choice must be made
between alienation as a part of many people's lives,
and foregoing the beneiits of industrialization, is
one alternative. Another is changing the locus of
decision-making in the production process, if that is
feasible. A third is both changing the locus of
decision-making and of ownership, if private ownership
as well as private decision-making is the root of work
alienation.
Solutions to the problem
Increasing the share of workers in decision-
making in the firm, or worker participation, is not the
only 'solution' which has been proposed to the problem
of work alienation. It is, however, the only one
which derives' principally from the view of alienation
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which sees it as derived from factors besides the
technology of production. The alternatives which have
been proposed most frequently assume that alienation
can only be overcome within work by altering the tech-
nology. These alternatives are:16 job enlargement,
anti-industrialism, automation and leisure. Job
enlargement would reverse the trend towards increasing
division of labor by creating a technology in which
each worker in industry - and presumably this is a
theory which is applicable also to workers in a
bureaucracy - is responsible for more stages in pro-
duction, and performs more tasks rather than less.
This is intended to make work less monotonous and to
make his product more identifiable.
Job enlargement counteracts the minuteness and
repetitiveness of industrial occupations by giving the
worker a more extended and elaborate series of opera-
tions to perform which enhance his skill and
versatility, and enable him to make a more significant
contribution to the entire manufacturing process.
Successfully introduced, it lengthens the work cycle,
introduces variety, allows the worker to set his own
work pace, offers him greater independence in deciding
on work methods, and gives him responsibility and
recognition for the quality of his work. 1 7
Georges Friedmann has described one such experi-
ment, at an IBM plant during world war II, in which
the jobs of semi-skilled workers were enlarged to
include new skills and more operations.18 In spite of
the success of several such experimental programs, the
movement has not spread in U.S. industry; moreover, it
is applicable only
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Automation is seen as a solution to work aliena-
tion by some, because, it is argued, it can alter the
nature of the most alienating manual work, in which
the worker is tied to a machine, paced by it, and
performs a few motions with it. These tasks can be
performed by new, automated machines.
Blumberg describes this alternative as follows:
In the automated factories of the future, workers
will not be tied to their machines but will have much
greater freedom than operatives of today - freedom to
control work pace, freedom of physical movement, etc.
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The rhythm of the automated factory - what has
called a calm and crisis rhythm - will be much
conduci-ve to work interest than the unrelieved
of the unending unvarying assembly-line. 19
been
more
tedi um
Blauner compared the workers in four industries
and found less alienation among the workers itn the most
automated industry, chemical processing, than in the
mechanized plants in the textile and auto industries.
He argues that
with automated industry there is a counter trend,
one that we can fortunately expect to become even more
important in the future... the alienation curve begins
to decline from its previous height as employees in
automated industries gain a new dignity from responsi-
bility and a sense of individual function. 2 0
This solution, like the first one discussed, is limited
by the number of jobs to which it is immediately
applicable. Labor is still cheaper than automation in
most industries, in many jobs. Moreover its applica-
bility is limited primarily to blue-collar jobs;
relatively few clerical and service jobs are likely to
be automated to the extent Blauner has in mind in the
near future. And automation will not necessarily
increase work satisfaction when it arrives: Blumberg
cites several studies of automation which resulted
reducing the skill content of jobs, not increasing
in
it. 21
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A much fuller analysis of each of these alterna-
tives and of the advocates of each and their arguments
is given by Blumberg, who deserves credit for many of
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the arguments given above. His analysis of the effects
of participation 2 3 as a solution to the problems of
work satisfaction and conditions of work is, together
with F.J. Stendenbach's paper24 on participation and
manpower policy, a starting point for the discussion in
the following chapter of the conditions under which
participation can affect worker satisfaction and the
factors which affect it. Blumberg analyzes the evi-
dence on alienation and worker participation to show
that increasing workers' share in the operation of their
workplace will increase their work satisfaction and
reduce their alienation. He manages to show that
within a given technology worker participation can cause
the extent of worker alienation to vary. He ccncludes
from his review of the literature that
there is hardly a study in the entire literature
which fails to demonstrate that satisfaction in work is
enhanced or that other generally acknowledged benefi-
cial consequences accrue from a genuine increase in
workers' decision-making power. Such consistenc of
findings, I submit, is rare in socialrresearch.
Stendenbach, in his study
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Participation of workers in decisions in an
enterprise potentially affects the job satisfaction of
workers in two ways. Worker participation may affect-
job satisfaction through the change that participation
produces in workers' role at work: job satisfaction
may increase even where the decisions made by workers
bring about no other changes in their work situation.
Participation of workers in decisions at work
also can influence job satisfaction through the objec-
tive changes in work situation which can result from
workers' influence on decisions. If work satisfaction
is an externality borne by workers and not usually
taken into account by the firm, worker participation
will make it possible for the workers to alter their
objective conditions in those areas in which they
influence decisions, and thus to improve work condi-
t ions.
In the next chapter, some variables in the kind
of participation which can be introduced into a work
situation are considered. Blumberg, Stendenbach, Vroom,
Verba and others 2 7 have shown that participation will
have a positive effect on the work situation. But,
how much influence on decisions, or how much partici-
pation is needed to produce such an effect? In other
words, how strong is the relationship between parti-
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cipation and job satisfaction? What difference does
it make at what level in the enterprise or at what
scale the participation occurs (on the shopfloor or
in the boardroom, for example?). In theory, at least,
worker participation can occur at any level in the
fi rm. In chapter 3 the effects on the behavior of the
firm of worker participation are examined.
The two sets of questions which are pursued in
the next two chapters arise from the focus of this paper
on the relevance of the problem of work satisfaction to
planners. If some form of social innovation seems
necessary, the next questions which arise are what
form will it take; how will it work; and what ether
implications does it have.
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INFLUENCES ON THE IMPACT OF
PARTICIPATION ON JOB SATISFACTION
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Evidence
The evidence which is available to examine the
effects of participation on worker satisfaction and
influences on it is far from abundant. But, as a
first step, data from a number of different types of
study can be assembled which has some bearing on these
issues. The most detailed data will be presented from
work-related research; relevant evidence from other
studies of participation in non-work environments will
also be used.
Some evidence is available from
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Russia in 1918; Algeria in 1962; and Italy in 1969 and
1970, for example. These documented examples, however,
are of smaller scale spontaneous worker control. Other-
sources which attempt to explain the way different kinds
of participation affect participants' satisfaction
include surveys of workers and studies of job satisfac-
tion, and comparisons of different forms of work
situation.
Studies of foreign (non-american) experience with
worker participation or control will be used for infor-
mation on the impact of participation on the individual,
and are the only source of information on the impact on
participation's effects in alternative forms of economy
- for example the self-management economy of Yugoslavia,
and the state managed economy of Poland; and the
partially planned economies of Western Europe. The
foreign examples include instances of both great and
small amounts of control at many levels of the firm,
not all of which exist in the U.S. or have been docu-
mented.
Measures of work satisfaction
This study is
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attttudes to their
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impact of worker
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Either one can indicate low labor satisfaction
with the job, directly, or as reflected in poor
job performance.
Productivity - the amount of output attributable
to each labor input. Workers producing output
well below norms (for example, the industry) may
Itself be an indicator of dissatisfied workers.
People who are dissatiefied with their work appear
to be less efficient than others, and thus to have
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lower productivi ty. One reason may be that where work
is not an intrinsic source of satisfaction, the need
is greater to spend time at work on alternative
satisfaction-producing activities such as interaction
with other workers.
The more 'subjective' variables may be derived
from interviews, questionnaires, or psychological
testing. They include hostility to management,
reported satisfaction from work, happiness, identifi-
cation with the enterprise, morale, commitment to work,
cooperativeness, "ego involvement". All these are
variables with which workers' satisfaction with the job,
or alienation from work, can be estimated.
The last set of measures are indicators of the
worker's mental health, usually derived from testing
and interviews - for example: creativity, and learning
ability; intefgration and individual development.
The next section describes a model of participa-
tion to clarify the meaning of participation in the
context of work environments. Each of the subsequent
sections relates the most relevant of the available
evidence on the impact of one variable on job satisfac-
tion where participation has been introduced. Each
variable (amount, scale, and directness of participa-
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tion) is first described in more detail and then
evidence is introduced. The final section draws Co-
gether the conclusions to be drawn from the chapter.
Definition of participation
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It is conceivable that any of the variables we
are considering which are listed above could appear in
any combination, although some combinations occur in
practice more frequently than others: for example, a
small amount of participation introduced at shopfloor
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level by workers' initiative, or a moderate amount of
participative power through elected representatives in
high level policy making, which is ittroduced by
government action (like Mitbestimmung in Germany), 2
are both examples which exist.
Table 2.1 presents one possibl
of participative organization for th
level and amount of participation ar
clarify the meaning of participation
the firm. The types are not mutuall
firm participation may exist at more
in a different amount at each level.
e typology of forms
e enterprise: in it
e varied: it should
in the context of
y exclusive: in one
than one level and
King and Van de Va11 3 provide an analysis of
participation which they relate to existing institu-
tions: they distinguish three levels of managerial
decision-making:
direction or initiation of policy
administration or preparation of policy
execution or implementation of policy
At each level they find two steps: exploration and
decision. They also examine the timing of worker par-
ticipation in each system. Table 2.2 presents their
model of the timing of workers' participation.
Table 2.1-
Workers' Power and the Level of Participation
Level of Participation:
Amount of Power
Shopfioor
Workers set their own
pace, control work
environment with
little or no direct
supervision
Complete control of
work physical environment
some control of timing
some freedom from
supervision; standards set
by work group
As above; production
norms set by
management
Control of some aspedts
of work speed, and
of environment
Close supervision
Piecework: timing of
jobs done by management
butsome control of work
speed and method by
workers
Close supervision, pace
No Participation: set by machines or
supervisors and enforced.
Workers
make al
own all
control
run the firm,
1 decisions,
profits,
choice of technology
Workers are free to
run the firm, make
most decisions; all
or most profits go to
owners who retain
ultimate control
Equal responsibility:
Workers have equal rep-
resentation on boards with
managementand owners
Shared responsibility:
worker have a veto or a
say in some decisions and
have representatives on
boards of management
Routes open for ideas from
workers: they get compensated
for them
Workers are entitled to
information on the firm's
operations
Workers work for a wage
and work conditions bundle
set by management unilaterally
Firm
Control (most)
Codetermination
Minimal
Participation
Table 2.2
The Timing of Worker Participation
Systems of Participation
Britain
(Joint
Consultation)
Explore
Level of
Direction Choose
Level of E
Administration
NO
NO
Yugoslavia
(Workers'
Management)
Qualified YES
YES
xplore Qualified YES
Choose NO
YES
YES
Germany
(Mitbestimmung)
Qualified YES
YES
Qualified YES
YES
ExploreQualified YES -NO
Choose NO Qualified YES
Qualified YES
YES
3
Source: King and Van de Vall
Level of
Execution
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Amount of participation
The amount of participation means the extent of
the power which workers have to influence decisions in
the firm. The amount of power workers have as parti-
cipants in decisions at a given level depends on the
role they can play in decision-making. Workers as
participants may play a positive, negative, or
passive role in decisions at any level of the firm.
While the amount of power workers have can vary, a
passive role is the most limiting of the three, and a
positive role potentially the most powerful; while a
negative role could be powerful, less can be done with
it.
Schuchman in his study of Mitbestimmung in
Germany has developed a typology of participation
based on these modes , ranking the power of workers
from most to least. A modified version of his table
is given as table 2.3. It ranks the power of workers
from most to least and classes workers' role as
positive, negative or passive.
A negative role in the firm is a blocking or
veto role: one in which workers can protest decisions
and cause delays or veto them permanently. If workers
have relatively little power, they can use their role
to influence decisions, but ultimately they have no
Table 2.3
Workers' Role and Amount of Control.
Workers' Role Passive
Amount of
Control
Workers have
veto over
decisions
Temporary
Veto
a
Workers can
protest
decisions
Workers have access
to information on
the firm's decisions
and plans
Workers have the
right of decision
on all issues,
exclusively
Workers have the
right of
co-decision
Workers have a
temporaty veto
after which
management has
to negotiate
Workers must be
consulted but
their suggestions
do not bind the
management
Workers can make
suggestions
5
Source: Adapted from A. Schuchman and P' Blumberg
Negative
Most
Positive
Least
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direct responsibility for them: they can cause mana-
gerial decisions to be reconsidered, but cannot
determine the ultimate form of those decisions. A
veto on the other hand gives workers responsibility
for the decisions they are concerned with. They can
ensure that it does not take certain forms. The power
exercised by unions is largely negative - for example
they can declare certain working conditions unsafe
and refuse either permanently or until it has been
checked to operate with those conditions.
A positive role is one in which workers make
suggestions , introduce
alternatives in the ope
a right of consultation
decision, or of minorit
making bodies, then the
minate. However, where
total share' in operati
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conventionally
A passive role is one In which workers are
recipients of information about the operation of the
belong
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enterprise, and able to know what decisions are being
made, what the true costs of alternative policies to
the firm would be, for example. But with a passive
role, workers have no direct influence on decisions.
However, information about a firm's operations can be
very useful to workers in conjunction with a relatively
small formal role in decision'making: hence the union
pressure on firms in England to 'open the books'. 6
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As worker participation is increased, the
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alienating content of labor which derives from sub-
mission to external control is reduced. Moreover, the
amount of decision-making which is shared appears from
comparisons of supervisory techniques to be a component
in morale, with more sharing of decision-making produ-
cing higher morale. This is a further reason for
pursuing amount of participation as a variable. On the
other hand, it is possible that a very great amount of
worker participation could result in greater individual
powerlessness as the worker is then subject to even
closer control by the collectivity of his fellow-
workers. We therefore examine the evidence to see what
the effects of various amounts of participation are on
worker satisfaction.
The experiments and studies which can be expected
to have most bearing on this aspect of participation
are those in which the amount of participation is
varied while other conditions remain the same.
Typically, in experimental studies of this kind,
matched work units receive either participatory or non-
participatory leadership in performing a task or
instituting some change. The study which appears at
first to come closest to our need is Coch and French's: 7
they reported that the rate of recovery of job
efficiency (in learning new tasks) "is directly pro-
portional to the amount of participation", and that
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"... rates of turnover and aggression are inversely
proportional to the amount of participation". The i r
study, of workers in a garment factory, compared a
group with directive leadership, a group which parti-
cipated through elected representatives, and two
groups in whi ch all membe rs parti cipated in deci ding
how a change was to be carried out.
The results of the experiment show consistent
increases in the work satisfaction variables (at no
cost in productivity). However, the 'participation'
by workers was relatively trivial: in Coch and French's
study management had already decided on the changes
which were to be made; the group without participation
was merely told what the new work arrangements would
be. In the participatory groups the new work
arrangements were "dramatically" presented and dis-
cussed. The group (or representatives) then "approved
the plans". Although the mode of communication
differed, in both techniques the workers were informed
of a decision made by management.
It is not known whether the good effects would
have continued in the absence of any real power to alter
things contained in participation. This example
belongs at the extreme low end of the participation
scale of power or control. It is not a strongly
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persuasive piece of evidence for the effect of amount
of power on participants' satisfaction with work. In
another experiment in which participation meant some
real control, Bavelas 8 found that a group (also of
workers in a garment factory) which was allowed to
discuss and set production norms was more productive
than another which
the norm
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cipation characterizing the workers' job conditions.
This explanation emerges as far more convincing than
the experimenters' explanations which attributed
changes in productivity to: (a) the "Hawthorne effect"
of participating in an experiment; (b) to the develop-
ment of a group which "will... (perform) in harmony
with the aims of management" as a result of the care
and "regard to the actual sentiments of the workers"
with which innovations were introduced.
Later students of the Hawthorne experiments point
out that productivity and the workers' satisfaction
rose as long as their ability to participate in
setting experiments continued and increased; when the
experimenters lost interest in the experiment and
reduced freedom to participate, productivity and satis-
faction fell. The amount of participation which the
girls were allowed is described as follows by the
experimenters:
the test room observer was chiefly concerned with
creating a friendly relation with the operators which
would ensure their cooperation and he discussed their
work and attitudes to the test with them.11
The 'rules of the game', as they applied to the
shop, were changed... The girls were allowed to talk
more freely in the test room than in the regular
department. 12
in order that the experiment would not be spoiled
by varying attitudes on the part of the operators
toward the experimental changes introduced, it was
thought necessary to make certain that to every change
each girl gave wholehearted cooperation... the
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operators were advised of and consulted about changes
to be made, and several plans suggested by the
experimenters were not introduced because they met with
the disapproval of the operators. 1 3
(the girls) frequently commented on the freedom
from constraint and excessive supervision. In their
eyes their first-line supervisor ceased to be one who
'bawled them out' in case things went wrong; instead
he came to be regarded as a friendly representative of
management. This was what Operator 2 meant when she
said, referring to the observer, 'say, he's no boss.
We don't have any boss.
r
The progess of the Hawthorne Relay Assembly Test Room
experiment thus provides evidence that the relation-
ship between amount of participation and job satis-
faction is a positive one.
An experiment which involves a slightly higher
amount of participation again is Morse and Reimer's
study of clerical workers. They found that a group
whose participation in their jobs was increased
showed greater satisfaction than a group whose parti-
cipation was decreased. Several measures of morale
were used, more sophisticated than those available
for reevaluation of the Hawthorne study: "self-
actualization" possible; attitudes to supervisors;
satisfaction with the company and "intrinsic job
satisfaction". All these measures showed increased
satisfaction in the group whose amount of
was increased and reduced satisfaction in
whose amount of participation was reduced
is a more convincing linking of amount of
parti ci pation
the group
Again, this
sat i sfaction
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a shorter period, but point in the same direction.
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to be adopted for production, for example, have
implications for individual work conditions at the
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King and Van de VaIl 1 5 compare the levels at
which participation occurs - they distinguish the
level of the worker or shopfloor level participation,
the plant level, and that of the industry and
government:
workers participation may occur... as consulta-
tion in a shop or department, in a plant, in a
multiplant corporaticn, in a committee of steel or
mining industries or in a National Economic Council.
Although the primary focus of workers participation
traditionally has been the plant, it can be extended
from that level in upward and downward directions.
They argue that extension upwards to plant and industry
level is 'more important' because
crucial decisions are Increasingly being made by
managing boards of large holding companies, e.g. on
automation, relocation, agglomeration, integration and
discontinuance; by employers' associations, e.g. on
eliminating labor costs from competition between firms
in the industrial sector and by government agencies,
e.g. on safety and quality standards, antitrust
legislation, taxation and investment regulations.
If we argue
pation on workers'
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job satisfaction arise mainly from
ly material changes in work condi-
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changes which could eventually result from higher level
participation with power to change things, are longer
run alternatives, if potentially more far-reaching.
Hence in the short run, participation at intermediate
or shop levels again seems most likely to increase job
satisfaction. Moreover, by bringing about more
immediate changes in job content and relations with
fellow workers, participation at lower levels will
affect the meaningfulness of the job, the ability of
the worker to be involved in his work, and hence his
level of alienation.
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There is no one study comparing groups of workers
participating (with similar amounts of power in the
work situation) at different levels in the same orga-
nization. (Some participation experiments, similar
to ones described above, were made with supervisors1 7
but these were of low level participation although
the workers involved were higher in the job heierarchy:
it involved their participation in situations where
their job content and not higher level policy was
involved).
However, we can report on the effects of increa-
ses in participation at other levels than the shop-
floor, and compare the effect on work satisfaction
with the results of participation in the experiments
cited earlier, all of which dealt with very low level
participation at the workplace.
The Yugoslav system of worker self m
is worker participation at the firm level: i
the smallest enterprises the firm is run by
workers council. It should thus be a fruitf
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the U.S., of course, to make any direct comparison of
job satisfaction in the two countries meaningful).
Kavci c, Rus and Tannenbaum1 9 and Ob radovi c2 0 have
made studies of workers' attitudes and satisfaction in
Yugoslavia. They have compared, however, those workers
who are elected representatives on workers' and manage-
ment counci l
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in value. Kavcic, Rus and Tannenbaum's finding that
workers council members in Yugoslavia "do not differ
in their perceptions of aspects of the firm" (control,
communication, and decision-making) from other workers
and that "the councils do not provide the workers in
these organizations with the substantial sense of
control that councils are designed to provide. 2 1
However, they also found that workers council members
were more "highly involved" in their work. Thus the
Yugoslav evidence is not clearcut about the effect of
participation at this level.
India is an environment still more different
from the U.S. or Western Europe, but A.K. Rice's 2 2
study of reorganization in a textile plant does throw
some light on the effects of participation at a level
between plant and individual workplace. The "level"
was the reorganization of a large workspace in a
textile factory. When workers and supervisors were
consulted in the event, "the supervisors and workers
immediately took control of the system" 2 3 and
resulted in rising productivity and satisfaction. It
produced a "flood of technological suggestions... as
permissive and collaborative relationships were
established".2 4 At this intermediate level of decision-
making, direct participation came close to repeating
the results which were found in low level U.S.
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participation we find that it is apparently a factor-
of some importance, since Coch and French's low level
participants with representation showed some changes
in alienation, but the Yugoslav evidence suggests that
possibly there are no such effects at the level of the
firm or that they are not major, at least where
participation is through representatives.
Immediacy or directness of participation
The previous section on the level of partici-
pation raised the issue of the immediacy of partici-
pation: that is, whether the worker makes decisions
himself, or in conjunction with groups of his fellow
workers, or whether he elects a representative or
representatives to make decisions on his behalf.
Participation through a representative who is subject
to cecall by his constituency at any time may, but need
not, result in something between direct and indirect
participation: because the delegate is subject to
recall, there are stronger pressures to represent his
&lectors' interests.
The studies of Yugoslavia by Kavcic, Rus and
Tannenbaum and by Obradovic do not show a high degree
of satisfaction in the firms with indirect participa-
tion. The fact that in Yugoslavia the smallest firms,
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The Coch and French finding, however, does
correspond to what we would expect: that powerlessness,
and loss of self involvement in work (to take just two
of the elements of alienation) are more reduced by
direct involvement in decisions at the workplace, and
less by indirect involvement. Stendenbach 2 7 has
attempted to compare representative systems of parti-
cipation in employment with direct participation; he
failed to draw conclusions from the two, mainly
because of the shortage of adequate studies. But he
describes the wholesale failure of works councils, a
form of indirect worker participation at higher levels
67
of the firm, and attributes their failure to lack of
power and to unrepresentativity of delegates, because
they were in general so indirectly chosen.
The powerlessness and failure to acquire power
which typifies the works councils movement in Europe
is in marked contrast to the outbursting of energy
and will to acquire more powers which are typical of
accounts of participation by people, directly and at
lower levels: for example, Rice's comment "the super-
visors and workers immediately took possession of the
,28system... spontaneously chosen work groups..." No
such energy is as obviously rdleased in a more
representative system.
How and by whom participation is introduced
The way in which worker control is introduced is
the last of the variables we consider. By "way it is
introduced" is meant who introduces the element of
worker control into the work situation, and how. The
extreme alternatives are a scheme introduced by
management with no prior consultation with or informing
of the workers; and worker participation or worker
control which results from workers' choice and planning,
without the prior consent or encouragement of manage-
ment. We could refer to one extreme as participation
from above and the
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A participation scheme introduced at workers'
initiative and organized by them should, given the
nature of job satisfaction as we have described it, be
more satisfying than one introduced by management.
Trist's 3 0 studies of longwall mining in Durham bears
this out: wbere miners had developed a teamwork system,
which they organized and ran themselves, their work
was more efficient and the workers had lower absentee-
ism, sickness and accident rates. Miners reported
that the work gave more variety and meant that
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The examples which have been documented of
spontaneous participative schemes point in the same
direction: Babchuk and Goode 31 found a polling system
for salesmen's pay which substituted cooperation for
competition between salesmen which not only raised
morale and job satisfaction, as expressed by the men;
it also led them to take over more and more management
functions (compare the discussion above of direct
versus indirect participation). Spontaneous
participation schemes appear to have a greater effect
than ones introduced from outside on workers' job
satisfaction; but spontaneous schemes may fail for
another reason:
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environment) bears this out: they raised their produc-
tivity, and hence their incomes since they were paid
a group bonus, resulted in abolition of the partici-
pation scheme very quickly: it resulted in too many
threats to other parts of the system which had not
undergone any such organizational change.
The inherent greater effectiveness of spontaneous
participation in rai
from these studies.
than workers can be
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confirmed: the workers are indeed powerless and unable
to control their lives; workers' involvement in their
work then appears as ephemeral and perhaps a sham,
since it was so vulnerable to the forces which can end
it, as the supervisor did in Strauss's example of the
toy firm when he returned the speed of the production
line to a constant speed, which was less productive,
and more unpleasant for the workers, but which restored
his role.
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Conclusions
Surveying the results of studies of the effect
of participation on workers' job satisfaction suggests
some tentative hypotheses about the conditions which
will affect job satisfaction most. We find that the
amount of participation is a significant variable:
where workers' share in decisions is increased, they
report more satisfaction, or behave in ways that
suggest that conclusion. Where some workers' share in
decisions is more, and others' less, the first
reports greater
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which affects job satisfaction: a scheme which
apparently increases participation, but which gives
workers no ability to affect the circumstances of their
work,will fail. Whyte's example of the firm in which a
profit-sharing scheme failed because the bonuses for
productivity paid out had no apparent relation to the
wockers' industry that week is one example. Another
is described by one of the contributors to 'Vork'
faced with a sullen uncooperative work-staff,
the management decided on a bonus scheme. The details
were explained to representatives from each department
... there was to be a bonus on all production above a.
certain norm... After the representatives had reported
back, workmen stood about in groups discussing what to
do about the laggards, how to eliminate the bottle-
necks... resentment, tension vanished overnight...
(but) the bonus never seemed to have much relation to
what one's particular section or department had
produced... the men looked for an explanation... the
manager explained that the scheme was an informal one
freely granted by the management and he did not wish
to 'formalize' it by posting explanatory notices... he
said that the scheme could be revised or wound up at
any time, without notice.
We told the men, 'the bonus had been fixed by the
manager? 'Yes'. It could be so fixed, or ended,
again by the manager. The whole thing, they judged,
was a 'fiddle'.
From that time on, the bonus scheme, as an
incentive, was dead.
And he goes on to describe the lower quality of work
environment which returned. 3 5
The effect of the level of participation also
appears to be significant. Participation at low and
intermediate levels of decision-making appeared to be
the most effective. But the meaning of this finding
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is not clear, because the factor of directness is
combined in the available sources with level. No
examples were found of direct participation at high -
levels. If the Yugoslav "participants" or workers
council me-mbers are seen as higher level direct parti-
cipants, then that evidence suggests that the level
is very important and that participation in decisions
much above individual job level alone will not
increase job satisfaction much if at all. But alter-
native explanations can be found: that the success of
participation depends on the ability to produce
visible results,
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than direct participation. This raises the question
of what meaningful participation there can be if large
scale is a technological necessity: and what kind of
direct participation could exist in a large scale
organization. Is worker participation only possible
in small organizations where direct participation is
possible. A factor which has not been studied but
which suggests a possible direction is the effect of
representation with representatives subject to immedi-
ate recall at any time. Andre Gorz36 has described
this as the organization of the workers' representa-
tives in some Italian wildcat strikes of 1969 and 1970.
If it reduces the distance between representatives and
represented, it might present a way out of the dilemma
which otherwise exists.
Participation which is a result of
worker action, or which is suggested by t
and approved by management (e.g. the Tris
longwall mining techniques) if much more
our terms than participation which is int
management without consultation with the
at best much less successful. The exampl
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proxies, for the amount of participation, or the power
which participation brings: a scheme in which workers
erticipate in the introductory stages does, ceteris
paribus, give workers more power than the same scheme
introduced unilaterally by management; and a scheme
which can be revoked at any time by management limits
severely the scope of workers at whatever level it is
introduced.
terms
quali
those
The most effective participation schemes, in
of reducing workers' alienation and improving
ty of the work environment, thus appear to be
wh i ch
a) give workers. more power, that is make it
possible for them to bring about concrete
changes in the work environment and process;
b) are direct, or incorporate an element of
direct participation by workers', rather than
being exclusively indirect, through delegates
elected for a term of office;
the
c) are at
individual
least incl
the level of the firm closest to the
job, the shopfloor or office, or at
ude this as a factor; and
d) are introduced for reasons which are clear and
76
not suspect: either because they are the workers'
goals and they introduce the scheme, or because
management's reasons are known.
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Chapter 3
THE BEHAVIOR OF THE FIRM WITH
WORKER PARTICIPATION
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Although we have found no examples of theoretical
models of intermediate cases of shared worker and
management control, some literature exists on the
extreme case of workers control or worker self-manage-
ment, (based largely on the Yugoslav model of self-
management). The next part of this chapter looks at
these models, examines and questions some of the
assumptions made in them, and reports the conclusions
from those assumptions. Alternative assumptions are
proposed as substitutes for some of those used, and
some implications of the adoption of those alternative
assumptions are described. Implications of models
based on the extreme case of worker control
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with mixed control are discussed.
The following section pursues the alternative
assumptions suggested. Evidence is presented to show
that they are more plausible and to justify substituting
them in our discussion of the implications of worker
participation (for workers, and for the community) of
the more conventional assumptions.
In the final sections
of worker participation for
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Models of the participative firm
Much of the discussion in chapter two was of
forms of worker participation in which the workers
shared the control of decisions with management.
'intermediate models' are models of firms in which
control is shared by management and workers. Ulti-
mately many of the conclusions which can be drawn about
the behavior of such intermediate forms are based on
the behavior of the polar cases tn which all decisions
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are made by workers. This reflects the nature of
economic models: it is easier to describe the behavior
of a pure monopoly or of a purely competitive firm than
any intermediate case. Similarly it is easier to
describe behavior resulting from the maximization of
either profits or workers' incomes, than it is to
describe how a firm whose behavior results from a
combination of those two goals would act. What this
chapter will do is describe how the extreme cases will
behave, and refer to types of intermediate, shared
control suggesting how their behavior can be expected
to be analogous to that of worker- or to management-
controlled firms.
Models of the firm of the sort which are discus-
sed here do not give definitive
predict how even the extre
will work in reality. At
pursue the logical implica
the firm and the criteria
make decisions. Benjamin
the usefulness of such mod
Models of socialist
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and monopoly have played.
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organization are
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els of competition
al level of abstrac-
are constructed generally
precludes serious testing of the hypotheses which are
formally generated by the models. Rather they serve
as sensitizers, in that they make economists aware in
some systematic way of the problems that alternative
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organizations are likely to face. Out of this aware-
ness it may be possible to generate lower level
hypotheses with s-ome empirical content. 1
The models which have hitherto been developed of
the behavior of firms wit
management all deal with
which all decisions are m
papers, and books 2 by Benj
Robinson, Jaroslav Vanek
make up the literature on
of assumptions, which thi
more detail below. They
questions, not all of whi
about the firm under work
and output decisions of t
of resource
h worker participation in
cases of worker control in
ade by workers. The articles,
amin Ward, Evsey Domar, Joan
and Charles Rockwell which
this subject share a number
s section will consider in
are concerned above all with
ch are directly relevant here,
er management; with the price
he firm,"microeconomic aspects
allocation which are derived from a model
of the enterprise".3 Domar is interested in "how would
Soviet agriculture, or for that matter any economic
sector so organized, fare in such a wonderland?" 4
Vanek 5 has developed a "General Theory of Labor Managed
Market Economies" and Rockwell 6 is concerned more
specifically with growth and efficiency. Here we,-are
ultimately interested in some more specific aspects of
the firm's behavior: the effect on the quality of work
and on the locational and pollution behavior of the
firm. First, however, the worker-controlled firm is
described below - the assumptions which define its
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behavior are presented. Then they will be discussed
and some contested.
Ownership and control: all the models assume that
workers control decision-making, but that the
government retains ownership of the productive
assets and charges a fixed rate for its use.
"The means of production are nationalized and the
factories turned over to the general management
of elected committees of workers who are free to
set price and output policy in their own
interest".7
The environment is a perfectly competitive market
in the more fully developed models, although Ward
and Vanek also examine the implications of worker
control under imperfectly competitive conditions.
The labor supply is assumed to be such that
either the co-op is actually able to employ the
optimum number of labor units maximizing the
dividend rate (Ward, 1958 and Domar, 1966) or
that it is faced with a supply schedule of labor
- a complication introduced by Domar in his 1966
arti cle.
The decision-rule by which the firm operates is
that worker-managers are interested in maximizing
their individual incomes over a given period of
time. The income of each worker is his (or her)
share of the income of the firm after other
inputs have been paid for. Profits of the firm
are distributed to the workers as part
income of l
the maximiz
per worker
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worker equa
The product
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Domar calls
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worker-cont
as that of
nl, (which
ces as the worker-
fi rm, and a wage rate equal to the
wage or di vi dent rate of the worker-control led
firm, but which maximizes profits).
Pri ces of inputs and product are the same for the
worker-controlled firm as for its "capitalist
tw i n". What consi ti tutes inputs and product is
also assumed the same as for the "capitalist
twin".
The assumptions , as Vanek says:
can be summed up as implying a perfect, competi-
tive and smooth neoclassical work in which tbe moving
force, contrary to the capitalist shtuation, is
maximization of income per laborer.
*income per unit of labor input can be substituted for
"income per worker" if the assumption that labor inputs
are homogeneous is abandoned, or, in other words, if it
is not assumed that workers are identical and contri-
bute necessarily identical amounts of work or time to
the fi rm.
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Using these assumptions, it is possible to show that
When all firms of an industry use the same tech-
nology and free entry is guaranteed, the labor-
managed economy will be Pareto-optimal. In other
words, just like it ideal capitalistic counterpart,
the labor-managed economy will be producing the maximum
producible output from given resources and the maximum
social satisfaction for a prescribed distribution of
income. These conslusions follow from the fact that
competitive labor-managed firms equalize factor
margnial products to factor returns for all factors
including labor, from competition in non-labor factor
markets free entry of firms and identical techno-
log i es.
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The behavior of such a firm would lie between that of
the worker-controlled firm and that of the capitalist
twin, its position depending on the relative sizes of
the shares of workers and management.
The data presented in the previous chapter, and
other evidence which I will cite in the next section,
indicates that not all of the assumptions are
plausible. Moreover, the questionable assumptions are
ones which have bearing on the feasibility and method
of developing models of participative firms with less
than complete worker control , i.e. on whether the two
types of firm differ in kind.
The studies assume that workers
electing representatives to a workers
chapter two showed that participation
representatives is only one form of wo
pation; moreover, other forms in which
particpate more directly in the operat
are much more effective in reducing wo
and increasing job satisfaction. The
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fl 0 the studies
is not the
tion, nor the
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that all workers participate di-rectly, (i.e. not only
through election of representatives) in the operation
of the firm. If we make that assumption, then the
consequences which follow from participation, should
also be assumed. That is, job satisfaction will
increase, but also, productivity of the firm, given the
same factor inputs, output will rise. The studies
cited in chapter two and others show that participation
which raises job satisfaction also tends to increase
productivity. The evidence for this is presented below.
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The Evidence for Alternative Assumptions
Productivity and
Several
chapter 2 to
job satisfact
of participat
studies were
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ply additional evidence. Almost
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a minority of cases, that it at
n
least does not reduce it.
Bavelasll and Lawrence and Smith 1 2 both found
that the groups which set production goals as well as
discussed production or work-related issues were more
efficient than the control groups which discussed but
had no power to make decisions. Coch and French found
that the recovery of job efficiency after a change in
job content "is directly proportional to the amount
of production". 1 3 An improvement in workers' ability
to adapt to a change in job content will significantly
increase efficiency in firms where such changes occur
relatively frequently; in others that ability would
be used infrequently and affect efficiency less.
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Kurt LewinI found in a comparison of authori-
tarian and democratic ('participative') leadership
that the production of the two types of group was
superficially the same, but that when the leaders were
absent, production in the authoritarian groups dropped
significantly more than in the democratic groups (the
proportion of time spent working fell from 52% to 16%
in one authoritarian group and from 74% to 29% in the
other; in the democratic group it dropped only from
50% to 46%).
Morse and Reimer 15 found in their study of
office workers that productivity rose less fast in the
group in which th
reduced than it d
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felt. Verbal 6 summarises the
the fact that productivity can be raised without
a concomitant rise in satisfaction ought not to
obscure the fact that productivity and satisf.action
are mutually dependdnt.
Participation and job satisfaction are, we have seen,
related and we now find a link between participation.
and productivity. The latter link is weaker because
workers use their power to make decisions in ways
which raise the quality of the work environment,
times at the expense of their other, material outputs.
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which accompanies participation is the greater job
satisfaction which accompanies it: this acts as a
motivating factor producing greater effort. Another
is that in participating, workers exercise entrepre-
neurial functions. They do so more efficiently than
management can do, and hence increase productivity.
An example of this is described in the early stages
of a profit sharing scheme which eventually failed:
... workmen stood about in groups - discussing
what to do about the laggards, howi to eliminate the
bottlenecks , ways in which production might be
speeded up... The loading gang, between lorries,
would move back into production. Men sent to another
department for material and finding none ready, would
join in and help to get it ready. If there was a
bottleneck in assembly, someone would temporarily
transfer himseIf to the section concerned. I f a man
was late o're absent through sickness , the situation
would be 'remedied' often before the foreman could do
so himself. The division between sections and between
departments began to blur... Decisions formerly
referred to foremen would be taken by chargehands;
decisions normally taken by chargehands would be taken
by workers, or, more often, taken by workers in
consultation with chargehands... the pattern of autho-
rity had begun to change. Here and there in the new
atmosphere a man would make a decision and take some
action he would not have done before; and it was not
simply that they worked harder; they began cut jng
out unnecessary movement and unnecessary work.
The workers in this description were using a skill
they always possessed; but in the past they had had
no incentive to use that entrepreneurial, managerial
skill; to increase output. Previously, there were
disincentives to using them to increase production for
the firm, and incentives to using them to beat the
system. By opening ways to use these skills, wihich
are part of the
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theoretical models of the participative firm
by Ward, Domar, and Vanek all assume that
and the products of the firm are the same
f its 'capitalist twin'. But the empirical
not support this hypothesis. In Morse and
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on reorganized their work in more efficient
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capitalist 'twin' would be borne by workers. Workers
will maximize their income from the firm, including
both the 'wage' or money part of thei r income ar'd the
quality of the workplace in their decisions. Moreover,
in a firm which is worker controlled, the proportion
of income consumed as quali ty of the work environment
should be that which maximizes workers' utility, even
in an imperfect labor market. In the 'capitalist
twin' firm, imperfections in the labor market will
produce their real-world consequence: less than
optimal consumption of quality-of-the-work-environment
by workers.
With imperfect competition, there is no certain-
ty how the models of the firm with shared control will
behave. One plausible hypothesis is that in the
intermediate cases, an increase in the share of power
of workers will be reflected in an increased share of
revenues paid to workers, relative to that paid to
managers and owners. At least some of that increased
share will be paid out as improved work conditions,
if the increase in worker participation reduces the
imperfection of the labor market for workers in that
firm.
In Yugoslavia, the quality of work conditions,
and the provision of welfare facilities for workers,
is a function of the undertaking which "is tending
more and more to be emphasised" 2 5  (I.1.0. report on
Workers Management in Yugoslavia). The same source
continues:
Although this is not formally laid down in an
legislation, it can be said that the welfare functi
of the undertaking has come to be one of its
features... a decision on the amount to be allocate
to welfare activities indeed often causes the m 2t
proctracted discussions within the undertaking.
In Sweden, workers participation in management has
to the development of an elaborate system of safety
committees and representatives. 2 7
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'pollution' policy.
Implications for the behavior of the firm
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injuries are another cost borne partly by workers.
In the worker-controlled firm, the firm wi 11 reduce
risks by making greater investment in safety guards
on machines, protective clothing and equipment, gad-
gets for remote handling of dangerous products. I t
wi 11 also provi'de social securi ty benefits for
workers who are nevertheless injured or become sick.
What happens in Yugoslavia appears to be like
the predicted behavior of a participative firm: the
government sets basic safety and health standards, but
responsibility for operating the system lies with
worke rs management bodies:
it is considered that the workers have a suf-
ficiently close interest in safety and health measures
to be able to take the necessary action themselves.. 3 0
in practice, occupational health and safe ty
occupy quite an important place among the sub ects
dealt with by the workers management bodies.3
Roethlisberger and Dickson have reported that in their
interviewing program at the Hawthorne plant they found
that "safety and health" was among the most frequently
mentioned topics , and one on which they were very
unfavorable to the company; it ranked high in
urgency. 3 2  Safety and health standards 3 3  are an
important area of work conditions, in which improver
ment in conditions through preventional insurance
schemes will cause the firm to bear the cost instead
of workers.
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In firms in which workers participate onjy at
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some levels of decision-making, the kinds of changes
in work conditions which they can produce will depend
on the level at which they participate. Floor level
participation alone enables workers to control the
immediate job organization, timing and rates. Firm
level participation alone enables workers to have job
security and welfare plans. Firm level participation
ultimately is important in improving the quality of
the work environment because it makes it possible to
change the quality of work at shopfloor level by
changing technology and altering the method of pro-
duct ion.
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most workers; or they will stay behind and risk
unemployment, wich has both material and psychological
costs. If they do not relocate with the firm, they
risk having to move later to find a job, or having to
commute long distances to a new job. At best, even
if the worker is not unemployed long, he often loses
seniority and other advantages by changing jobs.
None of these costs are taken into account by
the capitalist firm. The worker-controlled firm will
include the costs to wo'rkers in deciding whether to
relocate and hence the number of cases where i t is
economic to move is likely to be much smaller. This
wi 11 be beneficial to the workers in the firm who in
the workers control case will have g reater job secu-
ri ty.
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The prevention of pollution by industry is
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obviously not a problem which will be solved by worker
control of decisions: except in a few cases, the
pollution decisions of the worker-controlled firm will
not differ from those of capitalist firms. The usual
approaches to solving the problems of externalities
created by firms which affect a community adversely
are prevention or discouragement through regulation
or taxation of the polluting firm. Another solution
which has been suggested is the establishment of some
form of community participation in firms' decisions.35
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'capitalist twin'. If we assume a firm with direct
worke r participation at shopfloor level and also con-
trol at firm level, then the assumption of identical
efficiency appears unrealistic: there is a considerable
literature on worker participation which shows that it
raises the productivity of the firm. The second
assumption which is questioned is that the inputs and
products of the firm will be defined in the same way
as in a capitalist twin firm.
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Finally, some implications of these alternative
assumptions for the behavior of the firm in dealing
with the quality of work conditions was considered.
More briefly, implications for location policy and
pollution policy were also summarised.
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Chapter 4
CONCLUSIONS
The questions which were posed at the start of this
can be rephrased as: What is the relevance of
r participation in management to the problem of
which is not satisfying? Under what conditions will
ntroduction of worker participation into a firm
the level of job satisfaction of workers, or -re-
their alienation?
It has been argued that job satisfaction is a miss-
lement in the work done by many people in the dev-
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nsideredaand-_ejected the arguments for increased
re with the retention of today!s alienating techno-
for job enlargement; for return to pre-industrial
ology; and for increased automation; as possible
rtain changes in work which would reduce or solve
roblems of job satisfaction and alienation. The
introduction
ternative st
problems.
of worker participation remained as an al-
rategy which might at least alleviate the
Empiical evidence derived from experimen
workers in which the amount, level, directness
of introduction of worker participation showed
icipation does affect workers' morale. Job sa
improved when the amount of participation was
ts with
and method
that part-
tisfaction
greatest.
paper
worde
work
the i
ra i se
duce
ing e
elope
alien
at ion
techn
dea I
We co
Sei s u
logy;
techn
or ce
the p
109
Direct participation affected job satisfaction more than
participation through elected representatives. Partic-
ipation at the shopfloor or office level appeared to be
more effective in raising morale than participation at
the level of the firm alone. Participation seemed to
be a promising strategy with respect to morale.
It was also found that participation schemes, intro-
duced spontaneous by workers or ones which were obvious-
ly in workers' interests, were more effective than profit
sharing schemes introduced by management to increase effi-
ciency.
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rticipation is more plausible if assumed to be one in
ich they participate through elected representatives
the level of the firm only, as the models in the lit-
ature assume.
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would be identical to what the 'capitalist twin' firm
would reach only with perfect markets.
The implications of the model of the worker controlled
frim with these new assumptions were examined; for the
firm"s policy relating to conditions of work, location,
and pollution. The new assumptions cause the firm to
spend more on work conditions-, to relocate less frequently
and possibly to spend more on pollution controls. The
changes in behavior of the firm with the new assumptions
did not seem to make it any less likely to be viable than
in the pure model..
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Imp 1 icat ions
The areas of planning in which workers' participat-
ion is most immediately applicable are those of develop-
ment programs for urban or rural poverty areas. The plan-
ning of new communities is another place where worker
participation would be applied by planners to the economy.
In development programs for poverty areas, the most
obvious disadvantages of participative firms would be
less harmful than elsewhers. Redistribution of resources
to workers in those areas is not undesirable, it is a
goal of policy. Public subsidies which are already paid
for development in those areas could serve as a source
of capital for the creation of participative firms, or
for the conversion of existing firms to some form of
worker management.
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the development of some further theoretical models
of workers controlled firms and economies. From these
developments, testable hypotheses should emerge to be
tested against reality.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
Experiments with worker participation: summary of the evidence
Alex Bavelas,(''Some Problems of Organizational Change", Journal
of Social Issues, Summer 1948, p. 48+):
Using workers at a garment factory, Bavelas compared the
efficiency of two matched groups of sewing machine operators.
One group discussed and decided on its production goal; the
other group discussed their work but did not set their production
goal. The first group was the more productive.
Lawrence and Smith ("Group Decision and Employee Participation",
Journal of Applied Psychology 1955, vol. 39, p. 334):
This was a study of workers in a (different) garment
factory using two groups, one of office workers paid a set wage;
the other of factory workers on piece rates. Half of each group
discussed work related problems but did not discuss or set
production goals, in addition to discussing the other topics.
Morale rose in all groups. Production rose in all the groups
but the increase in efficiency in the participative group which
set production goals was much greater; each of the participant
groups increased its efficiency over its original starting point
to a degree significant at the O',05 level and at the 0.01 level
compared with changes in the control groups.
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Coch and French ("Overcoming Resistance to Change", Human Relations,
1948, vol. 1, PP. 512+):
A comparison of three groups of garment workers who "participated"
in the introduction of changes in their job, with one group which
did not "participate". The group which did not participate was
informed of changes in the job. One group "participated" through
representatives who were chosen by the group who were to introduce
the new method. The two other groups were "total-participation"
groups in which all members shared in introducing the new method,
as the representatives shared in the second group. Management
had already decided on the changes to be made and set rates for
them. The participant groups were informed in a more "dramatic"
way of the changes. Both morale and productivity fell in the
first group, the non-participants, after the change. The customary
output restriction, low productivity, hostility to management,
and labor turnover occurred; within 40 days of the change 17% of
the workers had quit their jobs.
In the groups with participation, no quits occurred during
the first 40 days. Productivity rose after the change. In the
representation group relearning occurred faster than usual and
attitudes to work were reported good. In the groups with total
participation, efficiency rose almost immediately to a level
14% above what it had been before the change.
Morse and Reimer ("The Experimental Manipulation of a Major
Organizational Variable", Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology,
1956, vol. 52, pp. 120+):
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The effects of increasing and decreasing the level of decision-
making on workers in a clerical office of an insurance firm were
examined in this study. In two groups the level of decision-
making was systematically increased; in the other two it was
correspondingly decreased. In the "participation" groups the
workers had control of "work methods and processes, and personnel
matters, such as recess periods, the handling of tardiness, etc."
(Morse and Reimer, p. 122). The workers had the power formally
vested in the supervisor and also "control over some of the deci+
sions regarding personnel matters and work processes previously
made fairly high in the supervisory line (Daniel Katz, a colleague
of Morse and Reimer's, quoted in Blumberg, p. 88). The group
did not, however, have complete autonomy and was subject to some
of the same rules and regulations as other employees" (ibid). The
experiment lasted a year and a half. Morse and Reimer administered
questionaires to the workers,. interviewed supervisory personnel
and employees, and studied company records of turnover, absenteeism,
productivity, etc. The described satisfaction in work as composed
of four dimensions. They were self-actualization, attitudes toward
supervisors, satisfaction with the company, and "intrinsic job
satisfaction". With every measure of satisfaction, the workers
in the participative sections were more satisfied, and the workers
in the hierarchical sections were less satisfied than before the
changes in control.
Productivity rose in both sections, but by more (14%) in
the hierarchical sections than in the participative sections were
it rose by only 10% on average.
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The 'Haw thorne Experiments : Rozethlisberger and Dickson (Manage-
ment and the Worker, .Harvard University Press,1938 ):
In their study of the Relay Assembly Test Room, Roethlisberger
and Dickson studied the effects of changes in the work environment
on a small sample of workers whose job was assembling electrical
equipment parts. The researchers planned to alter systematically
conditions of work such as the number and duration of rest periods,
improved diet, shorter work days and work weeks, and the effect
of wage incentives. Each of these variables was expected to
have an effect on the productivity of the workers. During the
first part of the experiment, up till 1929, productivity rose
fairly steadily no matter what changes were introduced, or
whether work conditions as they were defined by the experimenters
were improved or worsened. Morale similarly rose. During this
period of the experiment, the girls were allowed to discuss
changes to be introduced, to suggest changes to be tried, and
even to veto changes. The foreman from the main workshop was
excluded and replaced by supervision by the experimenters. The
workers had a much higher amount of participation in deciding
their work conditions than they had had previously.
The experiment continued after 1929' although Roethlisberger
and Dickson did not report on it in any detail. During this
period, the experimenters lost interest in the Relay Assembly Test
Room part of their study. As the experimenters' interest in the
study declined, the amount of participation which the operators
were allowed in setting the experiment was reduced. Their working
conditions were changed without notice. The workers had less con-
trol over their jobs. The workers' control over their jobs was
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further reduced by the depression which dictated changes in the
work conditions of the test room such as shorter hours and lay-offs
which even the experimenters could not control. During the
period, the workers' productivity no longer improved, as it had
continuously during the first two years of the experiment. After
the lay-offs began, productivity fell to a lower level than it
had ever been before. The morale of the workers fell simultaneously:
workers in the test room became bored, disillusioned, and restive.
"The degree of direct workers' participation in decision-making,
however, did undergo a marked change after 1929, and its decline
was roughly coincidental with the rise of disaffection among the
workers" (Blumberg, p. 40).
Strauss (in William F. White, Money and Motivation, Harper and
Row, New York, 1955, p.90'):
Strauss has described an instance of participation at shop-
floor level which involved direct control by workers of the speed
and environment in which they worked. In a toy factory, the
female workers whose job was to paint toys showed very low
productivity after their job had been re-engineered. They com-
plained of the speed of the line and of the heat of the room.
Management eventually allowed the workers to have fans installed
to cool the room, at the workers' suggestion, and also installed
a control for the speed of the production line in the room. The
girls discussed the speeds at which the line was to be set and
made the decision themselves. They varied the speed throughout
the day. On average, however, the speed was higher than it had
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been when set at a constant speed by management. Productivity
increased between 30-50% over expected levels, and morale rose
(partly reflecting increases in pay, since the girls were paid
piecework rates). The girls' control both over the machinery
with which they worked, and over supervision (since they were
making for themselves decisions which had been management preroga-
tives) both had increased, and these were presumably the cause of
their increased production and work satisfaction.
Trist, Higgin, Murray and Pollack (Organizational Choice):
The Tavistock Institute in London has studied a number of
cases in which worker participation has occurred in the context
of changing technology. E.L. Trist and others have described
alternative forms of social ordanization and of mining technique
in Northern England coal mines. The oldest technique is the
traditional method, in which each miner works one work place, doing
each stage of the work himself, using hand picks; and the coal
is removed from the face in tubs. The two newer methods are:
conventional longwall, in which the work is highly specialized,
subdivided and each miner has one job only; and composite longwall,
in which there is no rigid division of labor and miners work as
a team by dividing the jobs between them -- hence not observing
rigid job divisions.
Composite longwall working represents an alternative social
organization within longwall technology. With composite longwall
operation, a team of 50ror so miners ahd responsibility for
operating a longwall face and is consequently paid as a group
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(basic pay, with a bonus if a cycle is completed within 3 shifts).
The team of miners is self-selected from among comparable skill
levels. The team is responsible for allocating to its members
all the roles needed to do the prescribed task and is in control
of the workplace organization to a large extent. Consequently,
foremen are free to provide miners with services which enable
the cycle to proceed with greater ease, whereas with convential
longwall he must do "progress chasing". The Tavistock researchers
found that composite work gave miners' mosre variety, and meant that
difficulties when they occurred were shared, not restricted to
a few men on the shoft. Absence rates among composite longwall
workers were lower, as were sickness and accident rates. Produc-
tivity was higher for these teams. The investigators therefore
concluded that:
within the same longwall technology, composite organization
was found to possess characteristics more conducive than
(conventional longwall) to productive effectiveness, low
cost, work satisfaction, good relations and social health.
(Trist, p. 291)
r
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
Examples of firms with worker participation:
What follows is a brief description of those examples of
worker participation which may be unfamiliar to readers:
Yugoslavia: Worker Self-management
The Yugoslav economy is based on a system of worker self
management in enterprises, with some central planning and some
elements of community control.
In Yugoslavia all capital is owned by the state, which
receives for it a fixed return (so that the state is in the position
of a lender, with no say in decisions about the operation of
the firm). The enterprise is run by all the members of the enter-
prise who meet as the workers' collective. The workers' collective
makes decisions by democratic vote; it delegates much of its
authority for day to day decisions (except in small enterprises
with fewer than 30 members) to a workers council with up to 30
members. The workers council meets monthly and is responsible
for major decisions on basic issues: the enterprise's economic
plan, the allocation of the net profit, prices of the firm's product,
production plans, budgets, what to produce, etc. and for decisions
on labor relations. It appoints and can discharge the director.
It elects a managing board of about 10 persons which acts as
agent of the council, meets frequently, and is responsible for
carrying out the council's decisions on a day to day basis.
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The profits of the enterprise, net of the fee paid to the
state for use of capital, are available to the workers for distri-
bution or reinvestment, either in the same plant or in expansion
in the same commune or a different one.
The director of the enterprise, who runs it for the workers
collective, is appointed by aselect'on committee, by open competi-
tion, in conjunction with the workers council. The selection
committee is composed of representatives of the workers council,
and of the local people's committee. The manager can be removed
by the workers council.
Workers are elected to the workers council for a two year
term, with half replaced each year; no council member may serve
two consecutive terms. In small enterprises, members are elected
at large; in larger ones they represent units of the enterprise.
Candidates are nominated at meetings of the workers' collective;
the vote is by secret ballot. The union has some, but probably
not predominant influence in the selection process. 2
Attempts have been made and are being made to bring partici-
pation in the Yugoslav firm to the shopfloor level: enterprises
are divided into economic units of 20 - 100 workers, which are
responsible for production and innovation, and increasing productivity.
They make some investment decisions, and the profits of the enter-
prise which are to be distributed are shared between economic
units on the basis of their productivity.
The commune in which the firm is located shares in decisions
to a limited extent through its role in the appointment of the
manager; but most decisions about the operation of the firm are
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made by workers, as members of economic units and of the workers'
collective; by elected representatives of the workers, on the
workers council and the management committee; and by the director
who is chosen by representatives of the workers.
Studies of Yugoslav firms have shown that on the whole,
elections are contested; they are not dominated by the union or
the party, though both have branches in each enterprise. Limits
on the terms and number of terms served by elected representatives
operate to hinder or prevent the development of a class of "workers"
separate from the rest who run the firm. And studies show that
workers management has produced developments whichwere not fore-
seen or wanted by the government and the party, which suggests
again that they do not control firms: wage and price increases,
the development of increasing concentration in Yugoslav industry
and of monopolistic practices in Yugoslav firms, which led to the
need for anti-trust legislation. Studies of Yugoslav worker self
management produce results which show that workers in worker
managed enterprises believe that they do have significant amounts
of control of the operation of their enterprises.3
West Germany: Mitbestimmung
In Western Europe, West Germanyl has the most extensive
form of workers participation: its scheme of Mitbestimmung
(codetermination) was introduced (as a result of labor pressure
in the coal, iron and steel industries after World War 11), in the
early '50s, when it was considered vital to West Germany's
recovery to raise productivity in those sectors. In each firm
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covered by the legislation, labor representatives, chosen by the
workers council (all workers in the firm) and by the unions,
sit on the supervisory board together with an equal number of
representatives of the owners and management and with one indepen-
dent member approved by both sides. The executive board of each
firm includes a labor member.
The system of Mitbestimmung was first established in federal
law in the largest firms; in 1956 it was extended to holding
companies controlling mainly firms subject to the 1951 law. The
smaller firms in the coal and steel industries and all firms in
other industries have a system of participation and representa-
tion which falls well short of Mitbestimmung in the control it
gives to worker: workers are consulted by management, but have
no final say in decisions.
The presence of both a type of worker control and of partici-
pation in German firms is a potential source of some evidence on
the differences in impact on individual workers of the two
systems. In the firms with codetermination industrial relations
appear to be better; the enterprises with codetermination lead
the way in the German economy with social services and provision
of fringe benefits. They use more of their receipts for wages and
other benefits to workers than do the correspondingly sized
firms in industries without Mitbestimmung. The differences between
control and participation do appear to be represented in differences
in behavior between the two types of system.
In firms with Mitbestimmung, the firm is controlled both by
workers and by private owners. The profits go to the owners; but
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as a result of pressures from worker directors a share of profits
goes to workers as expenditures on wages, fringe benefits, social
services, etc. Firms withparti~cAatfon have workers who have less
power: they can comment and make suggestions but are not able
to impose any decisions on the firm.
United States: The Scanlon Plan
The Scanlon Plani is probably the most important workers
participation scheme to be put into practice in the U.S.: it
has been applied in a number of firms; and results of its appli-
cation have been documented and evaluated. The differences
which exist between the versions used in different firms are
relatively small.
The plan was originally devised in the early 1950's by
Joseph Scanlon of the MIT department of Industrial Relations. It
is designed to be introduced by workers and management in collabora-
tion. Its advocates attribute some failures of the plan to
failure at this point: the imposition of "participation" by
managers on workers with inadequate prior consultation and agree-
ment with them. This arouses (possibly justified) suspicions
among employees that the management is trying to put something over
on them. In many cases, however, the Scanlon Plan is introduced
because a firm is in financial difficulties and in danger of
closing down. In this case, the similarity of interests of
workers and management is obvious.
The plan calls for a sharing of profits, or of the increases
in profits attributable to increased productivity, between owners
MIT braries
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and workers in.the firm. It includes opening of managerial
decisions and the running of the firm to workers: they are given
access to information about the firm to a greater extent than is
usual. A major component is the opening of routes to the acceptance
of workers' ideas to increase the efficiency of the firm or plant,
the ideas being evaluated by joint worker-management committees.
Unlike most suggestion plans, the Scanlon Plan does not reward
individual workers for their ideas, but shares the increases
in profits derived from worker ideas between all workers. Scanlon
Plan firms usually distribute to workers a fixed percentage of
any increases in productivity over a base period (before the plan).
The percentage ranges from 50% to 100%. The Plan implies "opening
the accounts" of the firm so workers can judge for themselves
that the calculation of bonuses is done fairly.
In addition to increased profits and incomes for owners and
workers, the plan's advocates claim that it increases productivity
and improves the quality of work-life for workers. Scanlon
writes:
If you visited one of the participating plants, you would
say to yourself, 'here are people at work, not resentful
or suspicious, not just here because they have to earn
their living they are enjoying their work. They are par-
ticipating'.
While initial successes of the plan may be attributable to
a "honeymoon effect", the plan has been shown by evaluations to
continue to raise efficiency and labor productivity even 2 or
more years after the initial phase. On average, as table 3.1
shows, one evaluation showed a 23% increase in efficiency over
2 years of operation.
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Problems with the Scanlon plan frequently arise at
management levels: lower level supervisors feel stripped of
authority, union leaders perceive loss of power, and higher
managers see the role of listening to initiatives from below as
an abdication of authority.
Percentage
Company
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Average
(unweighted
TABLE 3.1
Increases in Productivity in Scan
First-Year Sedond-Year
Relative Relative
Efficiency Efficiency
14.9 10.9
21.9 12.7
16.7 13.2
36.7 29.3
28.9 49.4
32.9 42.9'
38.7 25.1
14.1 16.5
12.9 23.2
6.8 13.7
22.5 23.7
Ion Plan Firms
Two-year Average
Relative Efficiency
(Unweighted)
12.9
17.3
15.0
33.0
39.2
37.9
31 '19t
15.3
.8.1
10.3
23.1
)>
Source: Frederick G. Lesieur, ed. The Scanlon Plan
MIT Press, Cambridge, p. 113.
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